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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the hypothesis that the economic divergence across 
Flemish localities between 1830 and 1910 is explained by the theory of Hernando 
de Soto. We hypothesize that the uniform land rights installed after the French revo-
lution provided borrowers with an attractive form of collateral. Conditional on the 
presence of local financial development provided by a new government-owned bank 
this eased access to external finance and fostered industrial and commercial eco-
nomic activity. Using primary historical data of about 1179 localities in Flanders, 
we find that the variation in the local value of land (collateral) and the variation in 
local financial development jointly explain a substantial amount of the variation in 
non-agricultural employment accumulated between 1830 and 1910. By 1910, indus-
trial and commercial economic activity was more developed in localities where both 
early (1846) rural land prices were high and early (1880) local financial develop-
ment was more pronounced, which is in line with the ‘de Soto’ hypothesis.
Keywords De Soto · Financial institutions · Industrial development · Land prices · 
Flanders · Nineteenth to twentieth centuries
JEL Classification N93 · O43 · R11 · R12
1 Introduction
The relative impact of geography, institutions and culture on economic development 
is hotly debated in the economic literature. In this paper, we study the combined 
effect of land rights and local financial development on economic activity. We give 
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special attention to the theory of Hernando de Soto who hypothesizes that modern 
land and property rights in general lead to economic development. They allow own-
ers to put up land and other property as collateral and thereby increase the owners’ 
access to finance (de Soto 2000). Collateral indeed has the potential to strengthen 
the incentives of a borrower to expend the necessary effort to make best use of the 
loan and thus alleviate moral hazard (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). If de Soto is right, it 
is not so much higher initial land values or the exogenous variation in local financial 
development that spark economic development, but rather the interaction of both. 
Indeed, the corollary of de Soto’s theory is that, present uniform modern land rights, 
localities that enjoy both higher land prices and a higher local financial development 
will in the long run, through improved access to credit, also enjoy higher levels of 
economic activity. In this paper, we put the theory of de Soto to a historical test by 
analyzing the early nineteenth-century history of Flanders, which provides an excel-
lent testing ground to disentangle the effects of improved homogeneous property 
rights, land values and local financial development on local economic development.
From the middle of the eighteenth century onward, most countries in North-
western Europe experienced a gradual decline of the importance of the agricultural 
sector and the ascent of industrial and service sectors. Following the United King-
dom’s industrial development after 1750, Belgium was at the helm of this transition 
in continental Europe. France, the Netherlands and Germany experienced similar 
processes, albeit during a later wave of the industrial revolution. Divergence in the 
adoption rate of new mechanized modes of production emerged not only between, 
but also within nation-states. By the end of the eighteenth century, the northern 
most region of what was soon to be Belgium had little organized industrial activity 
(Mendels 1971). During the long nineteenth century, the newly independent Bel-
gium became one of the frontrunners of the continental European industrialization 
(Mokyr 1974, 1976, 1977; Horlings and Smits 1997). Within Belgium, industrial 
activity initially remained centered in the resource-rich Walloon area. The textile 
centers of Ghent and Alost notwithstanding, Flanders retained its rural and proto-
industrial character throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. From the 
second half of the nineteenth century onward, the secondary and tertiary sectors 
became increasingly important in certain areas of Flanders. By 1910, Flanders was 
characterized by vibrant commercial and industrial economic activity that was une-
venly distributed across localities. We want to test whether the theory of de Soto, 
i.e., the combined effect of uniform land rights and local financial development, can 
contribute to understanding why some Flemish localities were more industrialized 
than others in 1910, despite having little discernable differences in industrialization 
in 1830. Since the presence of land rights and local financial development are pre-
requisites for the existence of a de Soto effect, we discuss them shortly below.
Recently, Acemoglu et al. 2011 demonstrated the positive impact of the institu-
tional reforms brought along by the French Revolution on the long-term economic 
growth in those parts of Germany with a Napoleonic government at the dawn of the 
nineteenth century. Similar to Germany prior to the French Revolution, the South-
ern Low Countries were dominated by three classes: the clergy, the landed nobility 
and the urban bourgeoisie. With some regional variation, these three social groups 
were able to hold on to large swaths of rural and urban property (Van Bavel et al. 
1 3
Land rights, local financial development and industrial…
2010). The specific institutional layout of the pre-modern society enabled these 
social groups to siphon off substantial amounts of capital (crops, cattle or cash) from 
the productive sphere (North and Thomas 1971; North 1981; Brenner 1981). During 
the aftermath of Napoleon’s invasion, much of the entry barriers and prerogatives 
that provided sources of rent for the privileged groups as well as the patchwork of 
idiosyncratic (property) rights were replaced by a system of modern homogenous 
property rights (Garaud 1958; Yernault 2011). In parallel, a relatively modern 
banking system emerged between 1820 and 1848. These first banks were predomi-
nantly geared toward the large-scale and capital-intensive industrial enterprises in 
the ore- and coal-rich Walloon area. Modern financial institutions with a local and/
or rural focus were virtually nonexistent in Flanders. Only with the foundation of 
the government-led Algemene Spaar- en Lijfrentekas/Caisse Générale d’Épargne et 
de Retraite (ASLK) in the 1860s, a modern savings bank system with a nationwide 
reach was established. As the large majority of early ASLK branches were set up 
through the post offices and since the location of these post offices was unrelated to 
economic perspectives in terms of commercialization and industrialization, the loca-
tion of ASLK branches in 1880 can be considered as approximately random with 
respect to potential economic development. We will therefore adopt the presence 
and depth of an ASLK branch in the Flemish localities as early as 1880 as a source 
of approximately random variation in local financial development to identify the ‘de 
Soto’ effect.
Beyond a reasonable doubt, the introduction of secure and uniform property 
rights has assured investors of their property rights and may therefore have stimu-
lated Flanders’ investment demand and economic development in several ways. The 
‘de Soto’ effect, which is only one of the possible mechanisms by which property 
rights may affect economic outcomes, entails that a system of fully fledged modern 
land rights increases a firms’ access to credit because the land can now be put up 
as collateral at a reasonable transaction cost. The presence of a ‘de Soto’ effect is 
therefore conditional on the presence of local banking services. A number of con-
temporary studies have confirmed positive effects of land rights in developing coun-
tries, including Thailand (Feder et al. 1991), Peru (Field and Torero 2003), Kenya 
(Place and Migot-Adholla 1998), Paraguay (Carter and Olinto 2003), etc. There are 
also several papers that fail to find clear evidence of the de Soto effect, but these 
instances usually focus on subjects (poor farmers, urban squatters) who operate in 
an environment without modern banks, making credit an expensive and unofficial 
business, regardless of the presence of property rights (Galiani and Schargrodsky 
2010). Recently, a positive causal effect of land rights on credit access was found for 
large Russian industrial firms (Karas et al. 2015). Here, banking services were pre-
sent before uniform land rights were created. Hence, the identification relied on the 
regional variation of land rights in Russia in the presence of modern banking.
Contrary to recent Russian history, uniform and homogenous property and land 
rights were present in the Southern Netherlands before the creation of the Belgian 
state in 1830. However, access to modern banking was still largely missing until 
the final quarter of the nineteenth century. To ascertain the existence of a ‘de Soto’ 
effect in nineteenth-century Flanders, we therefore do not rely on the local varia-
tion in land rights, but rather on local variations in land (collateral) values and 
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approximately random variation in early local financial development in the presence 
of uniform land rights. Hence, the identification strategy used in this article can be 
considered a complement to the one elaborated by Karas et al. (2015).
We thus hypothesize that the uniform land rights installed after the French revo-
lution provided borrowers with an attractive form of collateral that, subject to the 
approximately random presence of local financial development provided by gov-
ernment-owned ASLK, eased access to external finance and fostered non-agricul-
tural economic investment and employment. Studying more than 1200 localities in 
Flanders, we find empirical evidence that the variation in the local value of land 
(collateral) and the variation in local financial development indeed jointly explain 
a substantial amount of the variation in non-agricultural employment accumulated 
between 1830 and 1910. By 1910, industrial and commercial economic activity was 
more developed in localities where both early (1848) rural land prices were high 
and early (1880) local financial development was pronounced, which is in line with 
the de Soto hypothesis. In this sense, we not only contribute to the finance–growth 
nexus with nineteenth century data in the spirit of Bodenhorn and Cuberes (2014) 
but also shed light on one of the mechanisms through which bank finance has his-
torically affected industrial growth and development in the presence of well-estab-
lished land rights.
2  Economic development of Flanders (1750–1910)
2.1  Transitioning from an agricultural to an industrial society
From the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century, all countries in continental 
Europe experienced a gradually declining importance of the agricultural sector, to 
the benefit of the industrial and manufacturing sectors of the economy (Karel et al. 
2012; Mendels 1972; Craeybecxk 1963). In the process, the Malthusian trap that 
had governed economic and social life for centuries gave way to seemingly sus-
tained economic growth (Clark 2008). There were, however, stark differences across 
nations in the speed and depth at which this process of industrialization unfolded 
(for a recent overview, see Broadberry et al. 2010). The economy in the Low Coun-
tries was no different in experiencing significant change during this period.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, Belgium played a pioneering role in 
the takeoff of the industrialization on the European continent. Up until the Second 
World War, it was the sixth largest producer of coal, steel and a variety of chemi-
cals, trailing only much larger nations as the UK, Germany, France and the USSR 
(Buyst and Franaszek 2010). While commonly acknowledged to be the first coun-
try to industrialize after Great Britain, this stage of the industrial transition showed 
stark regional and local differences. While the first large-scale mechanization 
occurred in the Walloon area around the start of the nineteenth century (Pasleau 
2001; Gaier 1973), industrial production in Flanders remained limited to old textile 
centers like Ghent and Aalst (van Der Wee and Verbreyt 1985). While the south 
of Belgium experienced economic growth through a rapid industrialization, overall 
(proto-) industrial activity declined in the Flemish countryside due to a combination 
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of bad harvests and a steadily declining interest in the proto flax and linen indus-
try (Dejongh and Segers 2001). Up until 1850, the bulk of the population in Flan-
ders secured their livelihood with a combination of agricultural and proto-industrial 
activity (Gubin 1983; Jacquemijns 1928; Sabbe 1975; Dejongh and Segers 2001; 
Vanhaute 2007), but this specific type of agriculture, ‘Flemish husbandry,’ gradu-
ally broke down in the subsequent decades (Vanhaute 2007). By the middle of the 
nineteenth century, this evolution is clearly reflected in the employment figures. 
As Table 1 shows, around the middle of the nineteenth century (first reliable data) 
industrial activities occupied a comparable, yet limited share of the total workforce 
throughout Flanders. As a corollary, around the middle of the nineteenth century, 
employment in the agricultural sector reached an all-time high.
However, given the higher rural population growth during the nineteenth cen-
tury in combination with the partible inheritance system and low levels of migra-
tion, farm sizes became increasingly smaller as farm rents rose to exceptional lev-
els. At the individual level, this created the need for new revenue streams, at first 
in proto-industrial activities but increasingly as a part-time artisan or tradesman. 
The increasing rent revenues themselves sought a productive allocation as well, and 
consequently, substantial amounts of rent revenues were reinvested in the country-
side through credit. As Vanhaute (2007) noted, these areas (inland East- and West 
Flanders, South Brabant) were confronted with an accelerated commercialization 
of rural life and an upsurge in second-tier and third-tier towns. Artisans, tradesmen 
and small businesses gradually developed in the countryside, fueled by the afore-
mentioned rising flows of money. As such, a gradual deruralization took place in 
the Flemish countryside during the long nineteenth century. While overall popula-
tion pressure remained high, an increasingly smaller portion of them earned their 
income through agricultural activities. During the same period, substantial interre-
gional differences in industrial manufacturing employment developed. This regional 
divergence was recently illustrated by Buyst (2011). His analysis shows that in 1896, 
Limburg and West Flanders accounted for substantially less of Belgium’s GDP 
than Flanders’ central provinces. On the eve of WWI, Brabant and to a lesser extent 
Antwerp and East Flanders had substantially increased their share of industrial 
employment (Table 1). In Limburg and West Flanders on the other hand, industrial 
employment remained stagnant between 1846 and 1910. A more granular presenta-
tion of industrial employment per locality is provided in Fig. 1. Around the start of 
the twentieth century, industrial and manufacturing activity in Flanders is clustered 
Table 1  Industrial employment as percentage of total workforce. Source G. De Brabander. De regionaal-
sectoriële verdeling van de economische activiteit in België (1846–1979): een kritische studie van het 
bronnenmateriaal. Leuven, 1984
Antwerp (%) Brabant (%) West Flanders (%) East Flanders (%) Limburg 
(%)
1846 9.04 7.70 11.11 8.95 7.01
1896 10.39 12.85 8.04 12.73 6.64
1910 12.20 13.98 11.12 15.43 7.67
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around two centers in the South of West Flanders and the eastern half of the prov-
ince of East Flanders.
Within the literature, several models have been developed to explain the variation 
in the adoption rates of industrialization in Northwestern Europe and Belgium. Nef, 
for example, emphasized the unique and (in his view) revolutionary technological 
breakthroughs that resulted in an increased labor output and a new industrial mode 
of production (Nef 1943). More recently, Acemoglu et  al. (2011) focused on the 
discriminating effects of the Napoleonic rule on long-term economic development 
during the long nineteenth century. Another strand of literature cites the persistence 
of regional proto-industrial activities and their transformation to an industrial scale. 
In his studies on proto-industrialization in Flanders, Mendels stresses the phase of 
proto-industrialization, which constituted a ‘preparatory stage’ for the large-scale 
industrialization of the nineteenth century (Mendels 1972, 1971). He considered two 
elements to be of importance, first, the accumulation of capital by merchants and 
entrepreneurs, and second, the severing of the family-land bond (by making rural 
inhabitants almost exclusively dependent on their paid-labor incomes). As a result of 
these insights, several scholars have acknowledged the regional differences in labor 
supply (for example, the presence of landless laborers or ‘cottars’) and the type of 
agricultural production as driving forces behind an industrial takeoff (Craeybecxk 
1963; Goldin and Sokoloff 1982; Sokoloff 1997). During the past decades, the path 
dependency between proto-industrialization and industrial economic development 
as suggested by Mendels has gotten renewed interest. Dejongh and Segers (2001), 
for example, suggested a distinct relationship between population growth and higher 
arable productivity and a development path of the industrialization process. But 
these models struggle to explain the observed local differentiation in industrial and 
manufacturing development in Flanders. A first effort to bridge this gap was made 
by Rayp and Ronse. Using an empirical version of the Midelfart-Knarvik (MK) 
Fig. 1  Employment in industry and manufacturing
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model, they showed that for the first half of the twentieth century, the location of 
economic activity can be explained primarily through market potential (Rayp and 
Ronsse 2016). With regard to the transitional nature of the economic structure of 
Flanders during the second half of the nineteenth century, Vanhaute (2007) pointed 
toward increased capital investments as a possible explanation for the increasing 
commercialization and industrialization of Flanders. We aim to clarify what ena-
bled these increased capital investments. By focusing on the interaction between 
the value of potential collateral and local financial development in the form of for-
mal banking services in the presence of enforceable property rights, we investigate 
to what extent a de Soto effect (through improving access to finance) accelerated 
economic development in manufacturing and industry during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. At the same time, we seek to explain the local differentiation in 
the presence of the secondary sector in Flanders at the advent of WOI.
2.2  Expanding transportation networks
Preceding the process of industrialization, the transportation network in Flanders 
grew substantially. Traditionally, toll roads and waterways played an important role 
in transporting goods in the early modern period. In particular, the former can be 
considered the focal point of early governmental policy. During the second half 
of the eighteenth century, the road network nearly quadrupled in size, from 681 to 
2.223 km (Dejongh and Segers 2001). After a short intermission between 1795 and 
1830, development of new roads picked up again after Belgium’s independence. As 
part of broader infrastructure policy, the road network expanded once again from 
3.500 to 6.230  km. Unlike earlier, however, development focused on the eastern 
parts of Belgium, particularly the province of Limburg and the Campine area in 
the northeast of the province of Antwerp (Dejongh and Segers 2001). These efforts 
resulted in a dense and relatively equally distributed road network. Unsurprisingly, 
by the middle of the nineteenth century, Belgium’s road density (0.21  km2) was 
comparable to that England (0.22 km2) (Dejongh et al. 2000; Guldi 2012).
Waterways formed a second important mode of transportation before the Indus-
trial Revolution. By 1700, the Dutch Republic had a substantial (exceeding 650 km) 
network of navigable waterways, financed and owned by local entities. A similarly 
dense network of navigable waterways was lacking in the Southern Low Countries. 
This marked difference can be explained by the absence of government-led initia-
tives during the Austrian regime (unlike provincial roads) (De Vries 1978), with 
investments depending largely on local private initiatives (van der Herten 2000). In 
later stages, and especially during the period of the United Kingdom of the Nether-
lands (1815–1830), substantial investments were made by the state (for example, the 
substantial expansion of the port of Antwerp after 1865), provincial governments 
and private individuals (canals and waterways). By 1850, Belgium had the highest 
density of navigable waterways in Europe (0.05 km per square km) closely trailed 
by England and the Netherlands (0.029 and 0.04, respectively) and followed at a 
distance by France and Germany (0.006 and 0.005) (Bogart et al. 2010). Figure 2 
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Fig. 2  Transportation network in Flanders
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shows that especially West- and East Flanders were particularly well connected to 
navigable waterways at the end of the nineteenth century, as was the border region 
between Antwerp and Brabant. Limburg stands out for its lack of connection to the 
main transportation arteries and the major cities in the West Flanders.
Whereas the road and waterway network remained the dominant mode of trans-
portation during the first half of the nineteenth century, the economic importance of 
(local) railways expanded dramatically after 1850. Just 5 years after independence 
(in 1835), Belgium was one of the first countries on the continent, second only to 
France, to offer regular rail service (Grafe et al. 2010). By 1840, most major Bel-
gian cities were connected by railroad (Pounds 1990). As a result of private initia-
tive combined with substantial state investments, Belgium had the densest railroad 
network in Europe by 1870 (0.095 km2), outperforming even the UK (0.081) and 
France (0.080) (Bogart et al. 2010). Initially, the motivation behind this enormous 
capital investment was to ensure military effectiveness and maintain independence 
from the Netherlands (Bogart et  al. 2010). Soon, however, the railways proved to 
play an important role in redistributing industrial labor from the north to the south of 
Belgium. By the end of the nineteenth century, either through national or local rail-
ways, most localities were integrated within a larger transportation network (Fig. 2), 
allowing for the bulk transport of raw materials and finished products over greater 
distances. For example, in the countryside outside of Leuven, a city of circa 35.000 
inhabitants located 25 km east of Brussels, local industrial activity picks up signifi-
cantly during the final quarter of the nineteenth century, partly due to the mobility 
improvement as a result of the construction of a local railway line (Lefebvre 2003).
As a whole, Belgium’s transportation network expanded significantly from 1750 
onward. Before and during the first years of its independence, subsequent gov-
ernment investments focused predominantly on provincial roads and waterways 
(Dejongh and Segers 2001). From 1850 onward, investments were rerouted to the 
development of a vast local tramway and railway network. In time, the success and 
importance of this multifaceted transportation network created a symbiosis with 
the industrial sectors. As the development of a well-functioning transportation net-
work fostered industrial development, the enduring industrialization itself constantly 
pushed for new and more efficient means of transportation (van der Herten 1995; 
Dejongh and Segers 2001).
3  Property rights and land prices
By the time the Revolutionary Armies left the Southern Low Countries after being 
defeated in the battle of Waterloo in 1815, the region had been bequeathed with a 
new institutional framework, including a system of modern land property rights. In 
essence, land rights regulate the allocation of the remunerations that arise from the 
use of a specific piece of land (Deiniger 2003). Hence, property and property rights 
are a social construct; a consensus within society on how certain types of assets 
should be used, held and transferred (de Soto 2000). Several elements have been 
associated with the prevalence of stable and secure property rights, ranging from 
the exclusive assignments of land rights and a distinct demarcation of the parcels 
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to the presence of institutions to resolve legal disputes concerning conflicts and the 
evolution of land rights in response to changing relative scarcities (Deiniger 2003). 
The latter is in essence a reformulation of an observation made by Ester Boserup 
(Boserup 1965) in her work on agricultural growth. She showed that whenever land 
was abundant, the need for both formal and informal institutions to enforce owner-
ship rights remained limited. However, as soon as population growth made fertile 
land less readily available, property rights were needed to subdue social and politi-
cal conflict.
Large parts of Western Europe possessed property rights from the middle ages 
onward. In Continental Europe, this evolution was fragmented, mirroring the scat-
tered political and institutional contexts. In broad terms, common law was estab-
lished in France and the Low Countries sometime during the thirteenth and four-
teenth centuries. Key elements in this evolution were the gradual disappearance of 
the feudal system, the amelioration of the social and judicial position of the peas-
antry after the Black Death and gradual urbanization (Van Den Berg 1988; How-
ell 2010; Huppert 1986; Verhulst 1958). By the fifteenth century, property rights 
were institutionalized within larger legal frameworks. Both land and credit could be 
transferred through their respective markets (Van Bavel et al. 2010). Sale deeds were 
frequently validated either by notaries, aldermen benches or the manorial court. In 
densely populated areas, such as certain subregions of the Southern Low Countries, 
official surveyors even set out to trace the exact boundaries of each plot, but this 
depended on the initiatives of local lords. Despite the institutionalization of property 
rights and the emergence of active land markets, a universal system of land title reg-
istration remained absent at regional, let alone the national, level.
Furthermore, property rights themselves were not necessarily exclusive. 
Since different rights over land could coexist, several people often held rights 
on the same plot. The monarch could give a domain in fief to his vassal, who 
could then exploit part of it as copyhold. The copyholder would manage the land 
as if it were his exclusive property. Without the lord’s consent, he could sell, 
mortgage or lease out the plot as he pleased. Since there was no central registra-
tion office, land was being resold and/or remortgaged several times while offi-
cially still being the property of the lord. The formal annexation of the South-
ern Low Countries to France in 1795 induced a profound reconfiguration of this 
legislative framework (Garaud 1958; De Reu 2011). Soon after the invasion of 
the French, the former prerogatives of the nobility and the church were abol-
ished, as were the ‘old’ structures through which land was transferred. The wide 
variety of often overlapping rights that could be exercised on a single lot prior 
to the French Revolution was replaced with a straightforward division between 
freehold and usufruct. Furthermore, an official Land Registry Office was estab-
lished as early as 1796, which, after some initial organizational problems, was 
operational from 1802. This administration not only registered the ownership 
mutation of each plot, but was also responsible for the surveying and valuation 
of all plots (Hannes, 1967; De Reu 2011). Parallel to the foundation the land 
registry office, a mortgage registry to which every mortgage transaction had to 
be reported was founded in 1796. The mortgage register also made it possible 
for creditors to appeal the sale of a property. Finally, recent research on the rural 
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land market in Flanders during the final decades of the eighteenth century and 
the dawn of the nineteenth century has shown that transaction costs around the 
1780s were approximately 110% higher than during the first quarter of the nine-
teenth century (De Reu and De Vijlder 2014). By the time Napoleon’s armies 
were defeated in the battle of Waterloo, an age-old system of institutions, social 
conventions and mores had been uprooted and replaced by a new framework. As 
a result, property was transferred and mortgaged much more easily than before 
and at lower transaction costs. Consequently, the first condition of Hernando de 
Soto’s model, homogenous and free property rights, was in place.
With regard to rural land prices, significant differences can be observed at 
the interregional level (Fig.  3). While the value of the land reflects its intrin-
sic quality, there are other factors to consider as well (Peterson 1986; Menard 
and Ryden 2005; Heffer 2009). Key characteristics that explain these substantial 
intraregional differences include intrinsic soil quality, the ratio between buyers 
and sellers, access to navigable waterways and the presence of (nearby) urban 
markets to sell surplus production (De Vijlder 2018). Within the scope of this 
article, we are interested in the variation of average arable land prices, rather 
than in explaining their values. As can be seen in Fig. 3, average land prices in 
West Flanders were rather elevated along a thin stretch of coastline, (the polder 
region) but were among the lowest in the center of the province. As a whole, 
land values were substantially higher in East Flanders, Brabant and Antwerp. 
Particularly within the triangle formed by the major cities Antwerp, Ghent and 
Brussels, average prices were substantially higher. In the vicinity of urbanized 
areas, values gradually diminished the further away from the central hub. Note, 
however, that intrinsic soil fertility continued to play a major role. Around Ant-
werp, for example, prices gradually diminished within concentric circles around 
Fig. 3  The average value of arable land per locality
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the city. To the west and the east this development was gradual. Values plum-
meted in the dry and sandy Campine area.
4  Credit and banking development in the Southern Low Countries 
and Flanders
The high level of urbanization in combination with the early development of fac-
tor markets had, by the middle ages, created an environment within the Southern 
Low Countries wherein the use of money, credit and bills of exchange became 
a widespread and well-established phenomenon. In most of the Southern Low 
Countries, informal rural credit markets arose from the late thirteenth century 
(Thoen and Soens 2009; Van Bavel et al. 2010). Using annuities, defined as peri-
odical and redeemable payments in money of a fixed sum mortgaged on immov-
able property, credit could be secured by both smallholders and yeoman alike 
(Lambrecht 2009). Rural credit became increasingly widespread in Flanders and 
Brabant during the sixteenth century as interest rates developed a downward trend 
(Limberger 2009; Van Bavel et al. 2010). In Flanders, interest rates on perpetual 
annuities declined from 8 per cent during the middle of the fifteenth century to 
between 4.5 and 5% during the eighteenth century. Furthermore, as real rural land 
prices rose during the early modern period in response to a gradually expanding 
population, credit became a fundamental characteristic of both rural and urban 
practice during the early modern period, either to buy land, redeem older debts or 
purchase capital goods (Lambrecht 2009).
Despite the development of thriving land and credit markets, the complex 
regulatory framework of land ownership, the entanglement of different mutu-
ally exclusive rights and the absence of registration offices increased information 
costs dramatically. This severely restricted the working of credit markets during 
the Ancien Régime, with participation limited to locals or their relatives due to 
the otherwise high information costs (Nicholas 1971; Ogilvie 2001; Briggs 2009; 
Hoffman et al. 2004; Rosenthal 1994). Given both the complex system of prop-
erty rights and the lack of local supply of capital to satisfy demand, an impor-
tant role was set aside for intermediaries (either through kin-networks or semi-
specialized professionals, e.g., village clerks and notaries) to serve as proctors 
between borrowers and lenders (Lambrecht 2009). While these mechanisms ena-
bled the extension of credit outside of the geographical boundaries of the vil-
lage, credit networks hardly ever transcended the local sphere. More often than 
not they remained based on a personal connection between borrowers and lend-
ers, whether or not facilitated by intermediaries (De Reu and De Vijlder 2014). 
Consequently, factor markets were dominated by affluent locals (Lambrecht 2009; 
Limberger 2009; Brennan 2006; Schofield and Lambrecht 2009). This effectively 
restricted the supply of credit to the local economy to their aggregated demand 
for profitable investments. The French annexation of the Low Countries and the 
subsequent formalization of a new institutional framework and the introduction of 
a new paper currency (assignats) heavily disrupted local credit markets. Several 
eyewitness accounts suggest the implosion of formal and informal credit markets 
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during the final decade of the eighteenth and first decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury (Lambrecht 2009). Informal credit extension somewhat recovered during 
the subsequent decades, but then withered away because of the competition from 
alternative investment opportunities offered by government and corporate bonds, 
equities and deposits.
During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, banking activities were pre-
dominantly conducted by local banking families and by merchants that also started 
to provide banking services. Their activities were focused on the commercial sec-
tor and involved the extension of short-term credits and discounting drafts. These 
small-scale and locally operating institutions, often using the bankers’ own funds as 
working capital, had limited capabilities to fund large industrial projects (Veragh-
tert 1978). To support the burgeoning industrial activities in the Southern Nether-
lands, Willem I of Orange founded the Société Générale pour favoriser l’industrie 
national des Pay-Bas (Société Générale) in 1822. Designed after the example of the 
by then nearly 140-year-old Bank of England, the bank’s objectives were fourfold 
(Neal 1994). The new bank’s main objective was to promote the national industry 
of the newly formed United Kingdom of the Netherlands, through either the exten-
sion of credit or direct participation (Laureyssens 1972). Second, the bank acted as 
a dedicated savings bank, counting the urban bourgeoisie as its main target audi-
ence through a network of branches and subsidiaries in the largest cities. Thirdly, the 
Société Générale was licensed by the state to emit its own banknotes (Laureyssens 
1986). Finally, it acted as the State’s cashier, responsible for the administrative han-
dling of the kingdom’s debt emissions and the safekeeping of its tax revenues ((Lau-
reyssens 1989; Veraghtert 1978; Houtman-De Smedt 1994). However, only after the 
Belgian Revolution of 1830 and the succeeding economic boom of the early 1830s, 
the bank managed to gain a substantial foothold in the heavy industry in the South of 
Belgium (Witte and Parmentier 1986). By participating in the firms’ capital through 
the process of swapping long-term credit into company shares, the bank’s sharehold-
ings grew significantly in the capital-intensive heavy industry in the South of Bel-
gium. This expansion was partly financed through the SG’s savings bank activities. 
Its immediate success among the urban elites can be illustrated by the exponential 
growth rate of its holdings, from 1 million BEF in 1831 to 40 million 6 years later 
(Veraghtert 1978).
The mid-nineteenth-century economic downturn, which struck the export-ori-
ented industry in Wallonia especially hard, severely impacted the country’s nas-
cent financial industry as well. As debtors pleaded for deferral of payments on 
their loans (Kurgan-Van Hentenrijk 1977), depositors sought to withdraw their 
deposits. Without additional liquidity, the financial system would grind to a halt. 
By late March 1848, in a desperate attempt to get the situation under control, 
the government stepped in. Since a bank run was lurking around the corner, they 
established a fixed exchange rate for banknotes issued by both the SG and its 
government-led counterpart La Banque de Belgique (LBB). In conjunction, they 
tried to control the money supply by imposing a maximum amount of 30 million 
BEF notes to be issued by both banks (10 million by LBB and the remaining 20 
million by the SG). The crisis of 1848 had shown that a thorough reform of the 
banking sector was long overdue. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the SG 
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and LBB had amassed a pivotal role in Belgium’s economy, primarily through 
their combined activities as deposit and investment bank, their role as issuer of 
legal tender and their close intertwinement with the heavy industrial sector. As 
a first measure, the government relieved the SG and LBB of their right to issue 
banknotes and transferred this task to the newly created National Bank of Bel-
gium. Secondly, the government decided that they would establish their own sav-
ings bank as an alternative to private banking institutions such as LBB and the 
SG. While savings banks had existed since as early as 1836 (Tournai), the large 
majority of them were situated in the industrial centers in the South of Belgium, 
such as their naming suggests (e.g., ‘La Banque de Huy’, ‘La Banque Liégeoise’ 
or ‘La Veille Montagne’). These private initiatives were established and managed 
with hardly any regulatory oversight and were characterized by a close inter-
twinement with local industrial activity. These institutions were owned and oper-
ated by local industrialists. The bulk of the savings came from local industrial 
workers, and a substantial part of the bank’s activities were investments and cred-
its to local enterprises (Kurgan-Van Hentenrijk 1977). As a result of their local 
focus, the impact and reach of these institutions was very limited. By 1864, Bel-
gium’s 13 biggest savings banks represented only 40,000 accounts (0.9 accounts 
per 100 inhabitants) and 25 million francs in savings (ASLK 1965), underlining 
the relevance for a savings bank with a wider (national) scope.
While the crisis of 1848 made the necessity of a publicly controlled savings initi-
ative clear, the auspicious economic revival of the 1850s combined with an upswing 
of economic liberalism and anti-state interventionism (especially from Catholic cir-
cles) delayed the establishment of a public savings bank. In 1865, Belgium’s first 
public savings bank, the Algemene Spaar en Lijfrentekas (ASLK), was established 
when the Lijfrentekas (Pension fund society), founded in 1850, expanded their busi-
ness by offering savings accounts (Witte and Parmentier 1986). At first, the scope 
of the ASLK was limited to the main office in Brussels, which initially expanded 
quickly due to the fact that existing local savings banks as well as several SG sub-
sidiaries in the Walloon part of Belgium (in Nivelles, Dinant and Philipville to name 
a few) carried over their funds to the main branch of the ASLK. From the start, 
deposits could be made not only through the ASLK itself, but also through one of 
the 35 agencies of the National Bank of Belgium, the local offices and the Registry 
Office, extending the geographical reach of the bank by the end of the 1860s to most 
first- and second-tier towns.
By 1880, the ASLK was active in more than 505 Belgian towns and villages, 
resulting in a nationwide coverage of nearly one in eight communities. Table  2 
shows that there was a substantial heterogeneity in the initial spatial coverage of the 
bank. In the industrialized south of Belgium, especially in the provinces of Liege 
and Hainaut, ASLK offices—some full-fledged subsidiaries and most post offices—
were active in 23 and 40% of all communities, respectively. However, as is the case 
in Hainaut, the high levels of territorial coverage did not necessarily imply a high 
adoption rate among the population. These rates (expressed as the ratio of the num-
ber of account holders to the overall population) varied widely, with 6.1% in Brabant 
being the absolute outlier (column 2 of Table 2). In general, however, adoption rates 
fluctuated between 1.16 and 2.95%. Particularly between the first five provinces that 
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make up the area of our empirical analysis, clear-cut differences existed between the 
‘central’ provinces of Brabant, Antwerp and East Flanders and the peripheral prov-
inces of Limburg and West Flanders.
The driving force behind this significant expansion in geographical reach 
was the incorporation of local post offices as ASLK sales channels. In a move 
to expand the savings bank’s reach to as many inhabitants as possible the gov-
ernment, together with the management of the ASLK, decided in 1870 to allow 
basic transactions to be made through the local post offices, similar to the recently 
established Post Office Savings Bank in England. However, the bank did not 
become a part of the post office department, but remained an independent branch 
of the government, controlled by the ministry of Finance (Buyst and Maes 2008). 
The location of the post offices, however, was not related to economic perspec-
tives of the locality, but driven by the government’s desire to increase the popu-
lation’s access to this public good (Van der Herten 1995). The undisputed suc-
cess of collaboration between the postal offices and the savings bank can be seen 
in Table 3. By 1880, the activity through the post offices accounted for a quar-
ter of both the deposits and accounts held at the ASLK. Twenty years after the 
Table 2  ASLK branches, 1880. Source: Brussel, BNP Paribas Fortis Historical Centre, Archives de la 
Caisse Generale D’epargne et de Retraite (CGER) 1850–2000, no. 8, Rapports Annuels CGER 1865–
1885
Province Branch cover-
age (% locali-
ties)
Adoption rate 
(% population)
Avg. 
accounts per 
branch
Avg. savings per 
branch
Avg. account 
balance
West Flanders 16 1.16 223 278.329 BEF 1.249 BEF
East Flanders 16 2.62 550 198.372 BEF 361 BEF
Brabant 15 6.21 1226 806.857 BEF 658 BEF
Antwerp 19 2.26 616 551.929 BEF 896 BEF
Limburg 10 1.70 205 148.530 BEF 724 BEF
Hainaut 40 1.86 159 94.724 BEF 596 BEF
Namur 13 2.15 143 108.711 BEF 758 BEF
Liege 23 2.95 321 165.240 BEF 516 BEF
Luxemburg 13 2.51 145 116.898 BEF 807 BEF
Table 3  Savings accounts 
through post offices 1870–1910. 
Source: Brussel, BNP Paribas 
Fortis Historical Centre, 
Archives de la Caisse Generale 
D’epargne et de Retraite 
(CGER) 1850–2000, nos. 
8–12, Rapports Annuels CGER 
1865–1910
Post offices Saving accounts 
through post offices
Deposits
1870 427 4.416 891.114 BEF
1880 765 54.464 30.176.984 BEF
1890 819 511.595 192.290.475 BEF
1900 1.085 1.390.047 503.665.348 BEF
1910 1.496 2.290.114 770.939.732 BEF
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collaboration, nearly 70% of all accounts and 58% of all deposits were generated 
through Belgium’s post office network (De Belder 1986). The fact that the large 
majority of ASLK branches were set up through the post offices and that the loca-
tion of these post offices was unrelated to economic perspectives in terms of com-
mercialization and industrialization, suggests that the location of ASLK branches 
or subsidiaries in 1880 was approximately random with respect to economic per-
spectives. The presence and depth (measured through the number of accounts per 
capita) of an ASLK branch in the Flemish localities will be adopted as an exog-
enous measure of local financial development in the empirical part of the paper. 
The exogeneity of this measure of early financial development to early economic 
perspectives is also suggested by the negligible correlation between early finan-
cial development and measures of economic perspectives, such as the average 
house price of the locality or the distance to the major port Antwerp.
Despite the ASLK’s extensive rural branch network, a governmental inquiry dur-
ing the 1890s had laid bare that the established system of savings banks was unable 
to cater to the need of the rural peasantry. While a substantial part of the bank’s 
clients indeed lived in the countryside, few of them were farmers (De Belder 1986). 
Well-off artisans, merchants and civil servants made up the bulk of the rural clien-
tele (Van Mole 1986). Furthermore, while both the ASLK and the savings branch of 
the SG managed to attract savings from the countryside, a significant part of these 
amassed savings was lent to industrial corporations. The complaint that the existing 
system drained too much capital from the agricultural into the industrial sector was 
not unheard of (Delfosse 1983). In response to this societal need, and inspired by 
German and Dutch examples, the recently founded Boerenbond created a network 
of local Raiffeisenkassen to work in collaboration with the ASLK. With over 700 
Raiffeisenkassen spread throughout the Belgian countryside in 1910, roughly one in 
four of all parishes had a local cooperative, averaging 40 members per branch (Van 
Mole 1986). These institutions sought to collect savings from local farmers and to 
reinvest these, either through the local Raffeisenkas or through the lending activity 
of the ASLK, on the local level through loans and/or mortgages specifically focused 
on the supporting the agricultural sector. Although men and women of all sorts of 
backgrounds committed their life savings to the Raiffeisenkas, between 1895 and 
1910 non-farmers amounted to only 15% of the depositors and 30% of the credi-
tors (Van Mole 1986). Hence, the Raffeisenkassen remained a predominantly agri-
culturally focused venture. We will use the local presence of the Raffeisenkassen as 
an alternative, albeit less exogenous and less equally spread, measure of early local 
financial development.
Between the founding of Société Générale and 1910, when banks were first incor-
porated in the industrial census, the financial landscape was altered profoundly, as 
illustrated in Table  4. By 1910, there were a total of 3.3 million saving accounts 
with an aggregated deposited amount of over a billion BEF, on a total population of 
7.4 million. The monopolistic position of the SG’s savings branch, which remained 
untarnished until the crisis of 1848, had completely faded away by 1910. The market 
was clearly dominated by the government-led ASLK with over 2.8 million depositors 
and outstanding capital of 964 million BEF. At the start of World War I, the deposits 
of the ASLK even surpassed the banknotes in circulation (1.123 billion as opposed 
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to 1,004 billion (ASLK 1965). The commercial SG trailed from afar, with several 
municipal savings banks (not unexpectedly situated in the industrial hubs of the era) 
and banks set up by industrial companies and Raffeisenkassen following closely.
In response of the growing deposits as well as its changing socioeconomic role, 
the investment focus of the ASLK gradually shifted between 1865 and 1900. Dur-
ing the initial phase of the development of the bank from its inception in 1865 up to 
about 1880, funds would mainly be invested in short-term bills of exchange (both 
domestic and foreign, to the amount of 55–60% of the capital). The remaining 
40–45% would be invested in the longer term, in government bonds (30–35%) as 
well as loans and credits to businesses (10%) (Witte and Parmentier 1986). As its 
balance grew, the importance of short-term investments would decline significantly, 
in favor of long-term corporate bonds (often mortgage bonds collateralized with 
land) and government bonds (both local and national), as can be seen in Table 5.
Furthermore, the so-called sociale beleggingen, i.e., social investments, came to 
be a significant part of the ASLK’s portfolio. With building societies acting as mid-
dlemen, artisans, craftsmen and laborers were able to borrow substantial amounts 
at below-market interest rates, using property as the main collateral. The success of 
this initiative was immediate. Between 1890 and 1895, more than 8 million BEF in 
credits were extended. By decision of the board of directors, the maximum amount 
of each loan was set a 5000 BEF, suggesting that at minimum 1600 households 
obtained a mortgage during those first couple of years.
However, as evidence suggests, most loans were well beyond this threshold. 
Another major type of early social investments made by the ASLK was agricultural 
loans. While not an instant success story like the mortgage business (between 1884 
and 1890 only 3 million BEF worth of loans were extended), activity picked up sig-
nificantly after 1897, when yearly loans averaging 1 million BEF were extended to 
farmers (ASLK 1965). Consequently, by the end of the nineteenth century, what had 
Table 4  Savings banks in Belgium—1910. Source: Houtman-De Smedt, H., 1994, Belgium, In: Hand-
book on the History of European Banks, London, 47–90
Institution Number of accounts Overall deposit 
balance (in million 
BEF)
ASLK 2,808,549 964.668
ASLK (youth savings) 462,356 15.940
Raffeisenkassen 27,334 10.001
Société Générale 21,123 38.237
Municipal savings bank Tournai 14,284 4.695
Banque Liégeoise 5015 0.942
Savings banks of industrial companies 3234 8.442
Municipal savings bank Nivelles 2343 5.273
Municipal savings bank Aalst 809 0.677
Banque De Huy 189 0.248
Total 3.345,236 1.049,134
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started as a straightforward government-led savings bank had become deeply rooted 
within the socioeconomic fabric of Belgium. A substantial number of inhabitants in 
both urban and rural communities, either by opening up a savings account or apply-
ing for a loan or mortgage, had become exposed to a new type of financial interme-
diary. As Frère-Orban, one of the driving forces behind the creation of the ASLK, 
so aptly stated: ‘It [the ASLK, sic] therefore really gives birth to new resources. It 
endows society with hitherto inert and useless forces, because they were scattered, 
divided, or placed in disempowered hands’ (Parmentier 1986 p. 388).
5  Empirical strategy and data
5.1  Identification of the de Soto effect
We want to verify whether the combination of higher land prices and the presence 
of local financial development is related in a causal way to the later emergence of 
non-agricultural economic activity in Flanders, controlling for basic character-
istics like access to waterways or railways, the ownership concentration, the type 
and the usage of the land, and local housing prices, distance to Antwerp and county 
dummies. Before the French revolution, the proto-industry was small and equally 
developed across the northern part of the Southern Lower Countries (currently Flan-
ders). We explained before how industrialization had started in the southern part of 
the Southern Lower Countries in the 1830s, but the industrial development of the 
northern part was largely absent until after the 1848 crisis. We can therefore use the 
level of non-agricultural economic activity in 1910 as a measure of the accumulated 
Table 5  The ASLK portfolio in 1913. Source: Historical Database of Local Statistics–LOKSTAT, Ghent 
University, History Department supervised by Eric Vanhaute and Sven Vrielinck
Investment of the ASLK in 1913 Amount (in million BEF) Share of total 
(%)
Long term
Government bonds 355 25.56
Corporate bonds 252 18.15
Corporate bonds (parastatal) 99 7.13
Provincial and municipal bonds 243 17.50
Mortgages through social housing initiatives 96 6.91
Mortgages 33 2.38
Loans to agricultural sector 15 1.08
Miscellaneous 0.4 0.03
Short and medium term
Bills of exchange (foreign) 165 11.88
Bills of exchange (domestic) 73 5.26
Loans 42 3
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net growth of non-agricultural economic activity between 1830 (independence) 
and 1910. Employment is our preferred measure of economic activity because it is 
widely available early on through industrial censuses of the new Belgian state. We 
model economic activity per locality Yi in 1910 as (1):
where Pland
i,t−2
 is the average land price of the locality in 1846, Bank
i,t−1 denotes early 
local financial development, Zi,t−2 is a vector of local control variables, usually also 
measured in 1846 (or 1865 in one case), and ɛi is a disturbance term. If de Soto 
is right, property rights on valuable land will have especially beneficial effects on 
economic activity through the improved access to credit, and financial development 
will have more beneficial effects on economic activity if collateral is present in the 
form of valuable land that can be pledged. This implies the empirical hypothesis that 
∝ 3 > 0.
5.2  Dependent variables
We consider 1171 localities in the northern part of what is now Belgium (the prov-
inces of West Flanders, East Flanders, Antwerp, Limburg and Brabant), following 
the administrative division of 1910. Specifically, the measures of economic activity 
Yi are (1) YE1 the number of people employed by establishments in the second-
ary sector (industry) and tertiary sector (mainly trade) in 1910 per 1000 inhabit-
ants, (2) YE2 the number of people employed by establishments in the tertiary sec-
tor (mainly trade) in 1910 per 1000 inhabitants and (3) YE3 the number of people 
employed by establishments in the secondary sector (industry) in 1910 per 1000 
inhabitants. These data are drawn from the HISTAT database that was manually 
compiled from official government statistics based on censuses.1 Although general 
censuses of industry and trade exist from the late eighteenth century onward, only 
few offer a detailed perspective on the occupational structure of all the localities. 
During the nineteenth century for example, several censuses were carried out, but 
all of them focused on either specific sectors, omitted rural regions, or had limited 
reliability.2 The census of 1910, on the other hand, provides us with information on 
Y
i,t =∝0 + ∝1 P
land
i,t−2
+ ∝2 Banki,t−1+ ∝3 P
land
i,t−2
∗ Bank
i,t−1+ ∝4 Zi,t−2+ ∝C +휀i
1 See Table 1 for an overview of the used variables, as well as their respective sources. For an overview 
of the literature concerning (historical) trade, agricultural and manufacturing censuses, see: De algemene 
tellingen van de bevolking, de handel, de nijverheid en de landbouw sedert 1846 in België gehouden. In: 
Algemene volks-, nijverheids-en handelstelling op 31 December 1947. Deel I. Brussel, 1949, pp. 41–44; 
G. De Brabander. De regionaal-sectoriële verdeling van de economische activiteit in België (1846-1979): 
een kritische studie van het bronnenmateriaal. Leuven, 1984, pp. 145–156. (Interuniversitair Centrum 
voor Hedendaagse Geschiedenis . Bijdragen 97) N. Bracke, Bronnen voor de industriële geschiedenis: 
gids voor Oost-Vlaanderen (1750–1945). Gent, 2000, pp. 194–196; J. Buntinx, Nationaal Instituut voor 
de Statistiek: inventaris van het archief van de Economische en Sociale Telling van 1937 en vergelijkend 
onderzoek met de gepubliceerde resultaten. Brussel, 2003, 189 p. (Algemeen Rijksarchief. Inventarissen 
345); P. Olyslager, De localiseering der Belgische nijverheid. Antwerpen, 1947, 285 p. (Reeks van de 
School voor Economische Wetenschappen 32).
2 Respectively the industrial censuses of 1880 and 1846 and the trade census of 1830.
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the industrial (both secondary and tertiary sectors—excluding governmental organi-
zations) activity and employment on the level of the locality. The Central Bureau 
of Statistics, aided by the local authorities, led the practicalities of the undertaking. 
Each locality had to assign several clerks to perform the actual count. Each one of 
these clerks was responsible for an operating area populated by no more than fif-
teen hundred people. The original data provide information on the type of establish-
ment and their employment, using an intricate classification system. In total, this 
list entailed some 1272 industrial and approximately 153 commercial branches. We 
aggregated these data at the municipal level, in order to obtain an indicator for the 
degree of local non-agricultural economic employment.
5.3  Main explanatory variables
The key question we wish to study is whether local financial development and the 
local average agricultural land price interact in their effect on industrialization. We 
prefer agricultural land prices from 1846 as our measure of ( Pland
i,t−2
 ), to make sure our 
land prices predate the industrialization on the Flemish countryside, but still occur 
after the agricultural crisis of the early 1840s. The correlation with 1830 land prices 
is very high though, and our results are robust for using 1830 instead of 1846 land 
prices. (These results are available on request.) The data for the 1846 land prices 
stem from two agricultural censuses and are expressed in Belgian francs per hectare.
Unfortunately, no data on lending facilities are available pre-1910. Therefore, 
we employ a measure of approximately random early local financial development 
Bank
i,t−1 , namely the number of ASLK deposit accounts per capita of the locality in 
1880. These data were constructed based on the annual reports of the ASLK.3 Since 
obtaining a loan from the ASLK implied owning or opening a deposit account and 
since the internal flow of funds inside the ASLK was still very much constrained 
by technical hurdles by 1880, the number of ASLK accounts can be considered as 
a robust proxy for local lending activity. Since the establishment of the early branch 
network was based on existing post offices whose location was unrelated to eco-
nomic perspectives, we argue that early financial development as measured by 
ASLK branch activity offices is approximately random with respect to economic 
perspectives. In addition, the correlation between our measure of early financial 
development and measures of market potential, like the average house price of the 
locality or distance to Antwerp, is almost negligible, again stressing the randomness 
of the early financial development with respect to economic perspectives.
The welfare gains of the de Soto effect only accrue in part to the borrower if the 
lender has no substantial market power. In the reverse case, lenders may use their mar-
ket power to demand higher collateral and charge higher interest rates, with an overall 
negative impact on social welfare (Besley et al. 2012). Although the ASLK clearly had 
some market power, it was fortunately also a government-owned bank (part of the Min-
istry) with the explicit goal to help develop the local economy. Therefore, the objection 
3 Source: Brussel, BNP Paribas Fortis Historical Centre, Archives de la Caisse Generale D’epargne et de 
Retraite (CGER) 1850–2000, no. 8–12, Rapports Annuels CGER.
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of Besley et al. (2012) that the de Soto effect may yield welfare losses in the case of 
credit market imperfections does not apply to our case. Our measure of financial devel-
opment is especially well suited to test a de Soto effect, not only because the quality of 
the financial services will be approximately equal across localities since they are pro-
vided by a centralized state bank, but also because monopolistic lending behavior, that 
may prevent the emergence of a de Soto effect, should be mute or nonexistent given 
the explicit goals of this government-owned bank to help develop the local economy. 
These arguments, together with the large time gap between the dependent variable and 
the main independent variables (respectively more than 60 years and 30 years), are our 
main approach to ruling out reverse causality from industrial development to agricul-
tural land prices and financial development, an issue to which we will return in the 
results section.
As a robustness check, we also use the amount of savings per capita of the locality in 
1880 as a measure of local financial development, although the presence of a few large 
savers in the locality could severely bias this measure. As a further robustness check, 
we also look into lending data from Raffeisenkassen. These are measured later (1910) 
and are much less complete than the ASLK data, but the advantage is they also include 
direct data on locally disbursed credits. To ascertain that the results are not biased by 
financial development in neighboring localities, we also include a dummy variable for 
financial development in neighboring localities and its interaction with Pland
i,t−2
 , the agri-
cultural land price in 1846.
5.4  Control variables
Our base model is augmented with several control variables. In order to take into 
account local demand, we include (1) local house prices ( Phouse
i,t−2
 ), which are calculated 
as the average cadastral value per home in the locality in 1865 (first registration), and 
(2) the distance of the locality to the port of Antwerp, which became one of the main 
engines of the Belgian economy after 1865 and remains so today. Similarly, since the 
spatial implantation of industrial activity depended in part on transportation facilities, 
we include three transportation variables for the presence of navigable waterways in 
1896 (railway stations in 1900, and neighborhood railway stations in 1910. (Unfortu-
nately this is the first availability of reliable data on this variable.) We also control for 
the soil quality, the total acreage of the locality, the usage of the soil, the concentration 
of land ownership and the percentage of the locality that was communal property and 
hence could not serve as collateral for private investment, all measured in 1846. Finally, 
our localities are spread over 20 counties, which differ to a major extent in the level 
of wealth (demand), the importance of agriculture, the level of education and social 
norms. To capture the effect of these otherwise unobserved factors, we include a vector 
of county dummies ∝C . An exhaustive overview of all variables and their sources can 
be found in the "Appendix" Table.
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6  Results
We lay out our estimates for Eq.  (1) in Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9, varying the scope 
of the dependent variable. We generally find that the land price of 1846 is posi-
tively related to later economic activity in all estimated specifications, in support 
of the theory that collateral played a role. There is evidence that local financial 
development may also be related to the subsequent growth of non-agricultural 
employment. This direct positive effect of local financial development, however, 
tends to disappear once we allow for the joint effect of land prices and financial 
development. Focusing on Table 6, where the dependent variable is employment 
in industry and trade, we employ our favored measure of local financial develop-
ment, namely the number of ASLK accounts per capita in 1880 for the first set of 
regressions. We observe that the hypothesis that ∝3> 0 cannot be rejected at the 
1% level. Indeed, local financial development only affects industrialization and 
commercialization positively in regions where historical land prices were suffi-
ciently high, which provides strong evidence of a de Soto effect. In the remaining 
two sets of regression columns, we draw attention to our alternative measures 
of local financial development, namely local ASLK savings per capita (columns 
5–8) and local Raffeisenkassen credit per capita by 1910 (columns 9–12). Our 
results are robust for the former alternative measure. The latter measure is faced 
with a much weaker coverage of localities. As for the interaction of land prices 
and financial development in neighboring localities, we observe that the related 
coefficients are not significant for any measure of financial development in our 
model (see columns 4, 8 and 12), suggesting that our de Soto effect really cap-
tures the effect of local, rather than neighboring, financial development.
In spite of the large time gap between our dependent and our main independent 
variables (respectively 30 and more than 60 years), one possible avenue of reverse 
causality remains. It is still possible that localities with early high growth per-
spectives had an early higher demand for financial services that drives our results. 
However, the finding that the direct effect of early financial development reverses 
after including the interaction with early land prices ( ∝2< 0 , once the interac-
tion is included) indicates that there is no such reverse causality in our sample. 
Indeed, such reverse causality would imply ∝2> 0 in every equation, which can 
clearly be rejected. In addition, the demand for investment, and hence possibly for 
financial services, is controlled by including average local housing prices in 1865 
and the distance to Antwerp, the main port after 1865.
We proceed by considering employment in industry and trade separately in 
Tables 7 and 8, allowing for the fact that credit by the Raffeisenkassen, our alter-
native measure of local financial development, may be more important for financ-
ing in some sectors than in others. In Table 7, where the dependent variable is 
employment in trade in 1910, we can no longer reject ∝3> 0 even for the Raf-
feisenkassen. Credits from Raffeisenkassen seem to be related to more employ-
ment in trade establishments, especially in those localities where the land price 
was historically high. In Table 8, we consider employment in industry in 1910 as 
the dependent variable. Here the positive effects of local financial development 
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Table 10  Main results of Table 6, controlling for spatial dependence
Number of ASLK deposits 
per capita in 1880
ASLK savings per capita in 1880
Land price of locality in 1846 (in 000) 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.003) (0.003)
Financial development − 0.16 − 0.30
(0.293) (0.312)
Land price × financial development 0.28** 0.36**
(0.124) (0.150)
Average cadastral value of houses 0.05 − 0.02
(0.218) (0.192)
Campine − 0.06*** − 0.06***
(0.010) (0.009)
Loam − 0.03*** − 0.02***
(0.009) (0.008)
Polder − 0.01 − 0.03**
(0.015) (0.013)
Sandy_loam 0.01 0.01
(0.007) (0.007)
Waterway access 1896 0.01* 0.01**
(0.007) (0.006)
Neighborhood railway station 1910 0.01* 0.00
(0.005) (0.005)
Railway station 1896 0.04*** 0.03***
(0.006) (0.006)
Fallow 0.13 0.20
(0.171) (0.159)
Hay 0.00 0.01
(0.045) (0.042)
Grassland − 0.11*** − 0.10***
(0.036) (0.031)
Garden 0.79*** 0.70***
(0.210) (0.189)
Desolate_heath 0.00 0.02
(0.025) (0.023)
Common − 0.08*** − 0.07***
(0.026) (0.023)
Log(farming acreage) 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.004) (0.004)
HHI46 0.13* 0.13*
(0.077) (0.070)
ρ 0.510* 0.652***
0.265 0.233
P(Wald test = 0) 0.054 0.005
P (Lagrange multiplier test = 0) 0.035 0.003
Squared correlations 0.296 0.266
Observations 1.201 1.201
 N. Devijlder, K. Schoors 
1 3
Table 10  (continued)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
are limited to the presence of the ASLK accounts and savings. The presence 
and credits of Raffeisenkassen are not in any way positively related to industrial 
employment, whether land prices are high or not. It seems therefore that the Raf-
feisenkassen, next to financing agricultural development, also played a role in 
financing smaller trade establishments but not so much in financing industry.
To gain additional confidence that our results are not driven by the sheer presence 
of financial development, but rather by differences in the extent of local financial 
development, we exclude from our sample all localities where we have zero ASLK 
deposit accounts in 1865, reducing our sample from the 1171 original localities 
to only 181 localities. The results are strikingly robust. The estimations in Table 9 
reveal that, once we restrict ourselves to localities with nonzero financial develop-
ment, the direct effect of financial development tends to turn insignificant ∝2= 0 ), 
while the interaction effect between land prices and bank development remains con-
sistently and significantly positive ∝3> 0 ). This reinforces our previous results and 
implies we cannot reject the de Soto hypothesis: local financial development only 
leads to sustainable non-agricultural employment if land prices are high and vice 
versa. The interaction between past land prices and financial development in neigh-
boring localities is never significant and has no effect on our main effect of interest, 
suggesting that it is really local financial development that matters.
Throughout Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9, we included housing prices in 1865 as a con-
trol for local wealth and hence demand. In a few specifications, housing prices are 
positively and significantly related to non-agricultural economic activity in 1910. 
Thus, there is some relatively weak evidence of multiple channels by which prop-
erty rights may positively influence economic activity. The direct and sometimes 
positive effect of house prices suggests that, next to the very robust de Soto effect of 
land rights on economic development demonstrated in this paper, property rights on 
houses may also exert some positive effect on employment through channels that are 
more demand-driven. This indicates that the smoother and more homogenous prop-
erty rights introduced by the French revolution may also have stimulated investment 
demand at large. A deeper analysis of this possible demand channel falls beyond the 
scope of this paper and is deferred to further research.
Not surprisingly, early access to railways very robustly related to higher employment 
by firms 15 years later, again illustrating the importance of market access for economic 
development. Indeed, having access to a (local) railway station increases the number of 
non-agricultural workers by about 10 per 1000 inhabitants. This is a substantial num-
ber, since the average non-agricultural employment in total employment ranges from 
only from about 7% to more than 20% in 1910. This substantial effect of railways in 
early industrial development is perfectly in line with earlier literature in this field.
The percentage of communal land is always negative and sometimes significantly 
so. It seems that communal land ownership did not contribute to boosting industrial 
development, and if anything may have slowed it down on the margin. This does not 
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rule out that communal land may have fulfilled other functions, for example main-
taining social stability and guarding equity among the villagers during industrializa-
tion, but these roles fall far beyond the scope of this paper and are therefore deferred 
to further research.
7  Long‑run spatial dependence
It is obvious that over such long time spans the economic activity in one local-
ity may be influenced by the economic activity in its neighbors, generating spatial 
dependence in the simple regressions. The Moran I test (available on request) indeed 
revealed spatial dependence for our main regressions. Therefore, we proceed by esti-
mating a spatially lagged equation where we allow the spatial dependence of eco-
nomic activity of one locality on the activities of its neighbors:
where W the contiguity matrix of spatial weights based on the Euclidean distance 
calculated from the longitude and latitude of the locality’s center. Specifically, the 
longitude and latitude coordinates of either the main church or town hall of each 
locality were used. Distances longer than 20 km. are disregarded in the calculation 
of W. A positive 휌 indicates that localities with neighbors that are economically 
active can also be expected to be more economically active, and vice versa.
We lay out our results in Table 10, where we repeat our main regressions from 
Table  6, but now allowing for spatial dependence. Our first observation is that 
we cannot reject 𝜌 > 0 . The employment in trade and industry per capita indeed 
depends on that of the neighbors. Specifically, a locality will add about one job per 
capita per two added jobs per capita in the spatially weighted neighbors. There are a 
multitude of possible channels to interpret this pattern of spatial dependence, includ-
ing economic agglomeration effects, technology spillovers, trade spillovers, labor 
market spillovers, financial spillovers and many others. The analysis of these chan-
nels, however, lies far beyond the scope of this paper.
Our results from Sect.  6 are very robust to controlling for spatial dependence. 
Early land prices still exert a positive influence on later development, but they do 
so mainly in combination with early local financial development. Indeed, the direct 
effect of early financial development disappears altogether. This clearly indicates 
that financial development is only related to later growth in combination with 
the presence of early valuable collateral, which is clearly in line with our de Soto 
hypothesis. The results also reconfirm the absence of reverse causality running 
from early good economic perspectives to higher demand for financial services and 
subsequent economic development. Indeed, if this were the case the main effect of 
local financial development on later employment in trade and industry would always 
remain significant, which is clearly rejected by the results ( ∝2= 0 ). Railway stations 
are still strongly positively related to growth, and communal property is still not a 
positive contributor to the creation of non-agricultural employment.
(1)
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8  Conclusions
Between the French Revolution and WOI, Western Europe underwent profound 
socioeconomic changes. While the speed and impact could differ, most countries 
were confronted with a declining importance of the agricultural sector, to the benefit 
of the quickly growing industrial and manufacturing sectors, within the span of a 
century. Within the literature, several models have been developed to explain the 
interregional variation in the adoption rates of industrialization. Using the de Soto 
effect, we developed a model to explain local variation in economic development. 
We hypothesized that given the uniform property rights and the institutional frame-
work provided by the Land Registry Office and Mortgage Registry Office, the price 
differential of collateral (land) across Flanders in combination with the unequal dis-
tribution of financial services would partially explain the unequal development of 
manufacturing and industrial enterprises in Flanders. Using a combination of data 
collected by the HIS project and our own primary data collection from archives, 
we constructed a dataset covering more than 1200 Flemish localities over a period 
of 64  years, from 1846 to 1910. Given uniform property rights, exogenous land 
prices and the near random allocation of A.S.L.K. branches (which became actively 
involved in extending mortgage-based credit as of the final quarter of the nineteenth 
century), we find strong support for our initial hypothesis. We show that there is sub-
stantially more industrial development in 1910 in those Flemish localities that were 
blessed both by higher land prices in 1846 and higher local financial development in 
1880. Whereas in 1846 the level of industrial activity in these localities is low and 
comparable, the industrial take-up had developed unevenly by 1910. The observed 
local variation in industrial employment in 1910 can therefore serve as a good meas-
ure of the growth of the secondary sector between 1846 and 1910. The time gap 
between the dependent variable and the main independent variables already largely 
rules out reverse causality. However, it is still possible that localities with early high 
growth perspectives had an early higher demand for financial services. This demand 
effect is controlled for by including local house prices (measured in 1865) in the 
analysis. The observation that the direct effect of early financial development is no 
longer significant after including the interaction with early rural land prices also 
indicates that there is no such reverse causality in our sample. We feel confident 
therefore in interpreting our finding as evidence of the de Soto hypothesis that, given 
uniform and enforceable property rights and the local presence of modern banking 
services, higher land values provided collateral and increased access to credit, in this 
way fostering increased economic activity in capital-intensive sectors in the case of 
nineteenth-century Belgium manufacturing and industry. These findings improve 
our understanding of the locally differentiated scope, impact and speed of the indus-
trialization in Flanders.
These insights from Flemish history are also interesting for the many countries 
today that maintain some form of hybrid or communal land rights that fall short 
of full property rights. Indeed, while such partial or shared land rights may play 
an important role in maintaining equity among otherwise disenfranchised farmers 
and guard stability and local tradition, they also have limited collateral value for 
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banks because freely selling the land is barred. Our results suggest that in those cir-
cumstances local financial development may fall short of realizing its full economic 
development potential. Conversely, the introduction of full property rights will also 
fail to ignite economic development in the absence of local financial development. 
It is the combination of full property rights and local financial development that is 
needed, hinting at the complementarity of these economic institutions for instigating 
economic development.
Data appendix
Variable name Variable Operationalization Sourcea
Employment (YE1) Employment in trade 
and manufactur-
ing enterprises per 
capita in 1910
Continuous variable divided 
by the locality’s popula-
tion in 1910
(1)
Employment (YE2) Employment in trade 
enterprises per 
capita in 1910
Continuous variable divided 
by the locality’s popula-
tion in 1910
(1)
Employment (YE3) Employment in manu-
facturing enterprises 
per capita in 1910
Continuous variable divided 
by the locality’s popula-
tion in 1910
(1)
Land price Average price for one 
hectare of freehold 
arable land in 1846
Original values divided by 
1000, continuous variable 
per locality
(1)
Financial development 
measure 1
Number of ASLK 
accounts in the 
locality per capita 
in 1880
Continuous variable divided 
by the locality’s popula-
tion in 1880
(2)
Financial development 
measure 2
Amount of ASLK 
savings per capita of 
the locality in 1880
Continuous variable divided 
by the locality’s popula-
tion *1000 in 1880
(2)
Financial development 
measure 3
Amount of Raffeisen-
kassen credits per 
capita of the locality 
in 1910
Continuous variable divided 
by the locality’s popula-
tion *1000 in 1910
(2)
Neighboring financial 
development (meas-
ures 1, 2 or 3)
Variable that measures 
the financial devel-
opment in neighbor-
ing localities
Dummy variable equals 1 
if there is an ASLK office 
(Raffeisenkas) in a neigh-
boring locality
(2)
Land price Average market price 
for one hectare of 
freehold arable land 
in 1846
Original values divided by 
1000, continuous variable 
per locality
(1)
House price Average cadastral 
value of houses in 
the locality in 1865 
(first data point)
Continuous variable, from 
individual cadastral values 
of houses in locality in 
1865
(1)
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Variable name Variable Operationalization Sourcea
Surface Surface area of each 
locality
Continuous variable in 
hectares.
(1)
Campine Localities in the 
Campine regions, 
with typical poor 
soil quality
Dummy = 1 if locality in 
Campine region
(1)
Loam Localities that fall 
in fertile loam soil 
quality region
Dummy = 1 if locality in 
loam region
(1)
Polder Localities that fall 
in the very fertile 
soil quality polder 
regions
Dummy = 1 if locality in 
polder region
(1)
Sandy_loam Localities that fall 
in the moderately 
fertile sandy loam 
soil quality region
Dummy = 1 if locality in 
sandy_loam region
(1)
Waterway access 1896 Locality access to a 
navigable waterway 
in 1896 (first data 
point)
Dummy = 1 if locality has 
waterway access in 1896
(1)
Neighborhood railway 
station 1910
Locality access to 
neighborhood rail-
way system through 
station in 1910 (first 
data point)
Dummy = 1 if locality has 
neighborhood railway sta-
tion in 1910
(1)
Railway station 1896 Locality access to rail-
way system through 
station in 1896 (first 
data point)
Dummy = 1 if locality has 
neighborhood railway sta-
tion in 1896
(1)
Fallow Acreage of fallow 
land in 1846 as 
share of farming 
acreage
Continuous share, per 
locality
(1)
Hay Acreage of hay land 
in 1846 as share of 
farming acreage
Continuous share, per 
locality
(1)
Grassland Acreage of grassland 
in 1846 as share of 
farming acreage
Continuous share, per 
locality
(1)
Garden Acreage of gardens 
in 1846 as share of 
farming acreage
Continuous share, per 
locality
(1)
Desolate_heath Acreage of desolate 
and heath land in 
1846 as share of 
farming acreage
Continuous share, per 
locality
(1)
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Variable name Variable Operationalization Sourcea
Common Acreage of communal 
land in 1846 as 
share of total local-
ity surface
Continuous share, per 
locality
(1)
Log (farming acreage) Log of the number of 
hectares used for 
farming in the local-
ity in 1846
Continuous variable, per 
locality
Own calculations using: 
(1)
HHI46 Herfindahl–
Hirschman index 
of land ownership 
concentration of the 
locality in 1846, 
from individual 
cadaster data
HHI = s12 + s22 + s32 +···+ sn2 
(with si = share of land 
plot i in total acreage)
Own calculations using: 
(1)
Xcoord Longitude Continuous variable, per 
locality
(1)
Ycoord Latitude Continuous variable, per 
locality
(1)
a (1) Source Historical database of local statistics—LOKSTAT, Ghent University, History Department 
supervised by Eric Vanhaute and Sven Vrielinck
(2) Source Brussel, BNP Paribas Fortis Historical Centre, Archives de la Caisse Generale D’Epargne et 
de Retraite (CGER) 1850–2000, nos. 8–12, Rapports Annuels CGER 1965–1911
References
Acemoglu D, Cantoni D, Johnson S, Robinson J (2011) The consequences of radical reform: the French 
revolution. Am Econ Rev 101:3286–3307
ASLK (1965) Gedenkboek 1865–1965 van de Algemene spaar- en lijfrentekas van België. Sint- Augusti-
nusdrukkerij, Brugge
Besley T, Konrad B, Ghatak M (2012) Incentives and the De Soto effect. Q J Econ 127:237–282
Bodenhorn H, Cuberes D (2014) Financial development and city growth: evidence from northeastern 
American cities: 1790–1870, NBRR working Paper no. 15997
Bogart D, Drelichman M, Gelderblom O, Rosenthal JL (2010) State and private institutions. In: Broad-
berry S, O’Rourke K (eds) The Cambridge economic history of modern Europe, vol 1. 1700–1870. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 70–95
Boserup E (1965) The conditions of agricultural growth, the economics of agrarian change under popula-
tion pressure. George Allen, London
Brennan T (2006) Peasants and debt in eighteenth-century Champagne. J Interdiscip Hist 37:175–200
Brenner R (1981) The agrarian roots of European capitalism. Past Present 97:16–113
Briggs C (2009) Credit and village society in fourteenth-century England. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford
Broadberry S, Fremdlinger R, Solar P (2010) Industry. In: Broadberry S, O’Rourke K (eds) The Cam-
bridge Economic History of Modern Europe, vol 1. 1700–1870. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, pp 165–186
Buyst E (2011) Continuity and change in regional disparities in Belgium during the twentieth century. J 
Hist Geogr 37:329–337
Buyst E, Franaszek P (2010) Sectoral Developments. In: Broadberry S, O’Rourke K (eds) The Cam-
bridge economic history of modern Europe, vol 2. 1870 to the Present. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, pp 208–232
 N. Devijlder, K. Schoors 
1 3
Buyst E, Maes I (2008) Central banking in nineteenth-century Belgium: was the NBB a lender of last 
resort? Financ Hist Rev 15:153
Carter M, Olinto P (2003) Getting institutions “right” for whom: credit constraints and the impact of 
property rights on the quantity and composition of investment. Am J Agric Econ 85:173–186
Clark G (2008) A farewell to alms: a brief economic history of the world. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton
Craeybecxk J (1963) De agrarische wortels van de industrie in Vlaanderen. Belgisch Tijdschrift voor 
Filologie en Geschiedenis 41:397–448
De Belder J (1986) Het arbeidsparen 1850–1890. In: Van Put A (ed) De Belgische Spaarbanken. Lannoo, 
Tielt, pp 91–118
De Brabander GL (1984) De regionaal-sectoriële verdeling van de economishe activiteit in België (1846–
1979)- een kritische studie van het bronnenmateriaal. Bijdragen van het interuniversitair centrum 
voor hedendaagse geschiedenis, Brussel
De Reu P (2011) De Geschiedenis van de Algemene Administratie van de Patrimoniumdocumenta-
tie, organisatie, bevoegdheden, ambstgebieden, archiefvorming. Miscellanea Archivistica Studia 
198:200–220
De Reu P, De Vijlder N (2014) Crisis en continuïteit De vastgoedmarkt van het Gentse platteland door-
heen oorlogstijd in de tweede helft van de achttiende eeuw. HMGOG, pp 165–197
de Soto H (2000) The mystery of capital, why capitalism triumphs in the west and fails everywhere else. 
Basic Books, London
De Vijlder N (2018) The rural land market in early modern Inland Flanders and Brabant: a long run per-
spective. Rural Hist 29:115–143
de Vries J (1978) Barges and capitalism: passenger transportation in the Dutch economy, 1632–1839. 
Wageningen A. A. G. Bijdragen
Deiniger K (2003) Land policies for growth and poverty reduction. World Bank Group, Washington
Dejongh G, Segers Y (2001) Een kleine natie in mutatie. De economische ontwikkelingvande Zuidelijke 
Nederlanden/België in de eeuw 1750-1850. Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 114:171–194
Dejongh G, Van Campenhout B, Ceusters M (2000) In de greep van de markt. Belgisch Tijdschrift Voor 
Nieuwste Geschiedenis 30:5–47
Delfosse P (1983) La politique agricole de l’Etal beige en période de crise au XIXe siècle: les rapports 
de force dans une société en transition vers le capitalisme industriel. University Press Louvain-la-
Neuve, Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve
Feder G, Onchan T, Chalamwong Y, Hingladarom C (1991) Land policies and farm productivity in Thai-
land. Econ Dev Cult Change 39:443–447
Field E, Torero M (2003) Do property titles increase access to credit? Evidence from Peru. Mimeo, Har-
vard University Press, Cambridge
Gaier C (1973) L’industrie et le Commerce des Armes dans les Anciennes Principautés belges du XII-
Iieme à la fin du XVieme siècle. Société d’Edition les Belles Lettres, Paris
Galiani S, Schargrodsky E (2010) Property rights for the poor: effects of land titling. J Pub Econ 
94:700–729
Garaud M (1958) La révolution et la propriété foncière. Recueil Sirey, Paris
Goldin C, Sokoloff K (1982) Women, children, and industrialization in the early republic: evidence from 
the manufacturing censuses. J Econ Hist 42:741–774
Grafe R, Neal L, Unger RW (2010) The services sector. In: Broadberry S, O’Rourke K (eds) The Cam-
bridge economic history of modern Europe, vol 1. 1700–1870. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, pp 187–216
Gubin E (1983) L’industrie linière à domicile dans les Flandres en 1840–1950. Problémes de methode. 
Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis 14:369–401
Guldi J (2012) Roads to power: Britain invents the infrastructure state. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge
Hannes J (1967) De voorbereiding van het parcellair kadaster. Een bronnenstudie. Driemaandelijks tijd-
schrift van het Gemeentekrediet van België. 80:81–90
Heffer J (2009) Les déterminants du prix de la terre. Histoire & Sociétés Rurales 32:81–108
Hoffman P, Postel-Vinay G, Rosenthal JL (2004) Révolution Et Évolution: les Marchés Du Crédit Notarié 
en France 1780-1840. Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 59:387–424
Horlings E, Smits JP (1997) A comparison of the pattern of growth and structural change in the Nether-
lands and Belgium 1800–1913. Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2:89–106
1 3
Land rights, local financial development and industrial…
Houtman-De Smedt H (1994) Belgium. In: Pohl M (ed) Handbook on the history of European banks. 
Edward Elgar, London, pp 45–94
Howell M (2010) Commerce before capitalism in Europe 1300–1600. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge
Huppert G (1986) After the black death, a social history of early modern Europe. Indiana University 
Press, London
Jacquemijns J (1928) Histoire de la crise économique des Flanders (1845–1850). Koninklijke Academie, 
Brussels
Karas A, Pyle W, Schoors K (2015) A ‘De Soto Effect’ in industry? Evidence from the Russian federa-
tion. J Law Econ 58:451–480
Karel E, Vanhaute E, Paping R (2012) The low countries, 1750–2000. In: Vanhaute E, Devos I, Lambre-
cht T (eds) Making a living, family and labour. Turnhout, Brepols, pp 185–207
Kurgan-Van Hentenrijk G (1977) Geld en Bankwezen 1844–1873. In: Blok P, Prevenier W et  al (eds) 
Algemene Geschiedenis Der Nederlanden 12. Fibula- Van Dishoeck, Haarlem, pp 11–53
Lambrecht T (2009) Rural credit and the market for annuities in eighteenth-century Flanders. In: Schof-
ield PR, Lambrecht T (eds) Credit and the rural economy in North-western Europe, c.1200–c.1850. 
Turnhout, Brepols, pp 35–63
Laureyssens J (1972) Le crédit industriel et la Société Générale des Pays-Bas pendant le régime hollan-
dais (1815–1830). Belgisch Tijdschrift Voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis 3:119–140
Laureyssens J (1986) Growth of central banking. The Société Générale and its impact on the development 
of Belgium’s monetary system during the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (1819–1830). J Eur 
Econ Hist 15:599–629
Laureyssens J (1989) Financial innovation and regulation. The Société Générale and the Belgian State 
after independence (1830–1850). Belgisch Tijdschrift Voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis 15:223–250
Lefebvre W (2003) Het geografische inplantingspatroon van voedingswinkels in Leuven tijdens de tweede 
helft van de negentiende eeuw (1860–1908). Belgisch Tijdschrift Voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis 
33:91–127
Limberger M (2009) Credit, the land market and the connection between rural and urban economy. The 
use of perpetual annuities in Aartselaar (Brabant) from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century. In: 
Schofield P, Lambrecht T (eds) Credit and the rural economy in North-western Europe, c.1200–
c.1850. Brepols, Turnhout, pp 63–74
Lis C, Soly H (1980) Armoede & kapitalisme in pre-industrieel Europa, Antwerp
Menard R, Ryden D (2005) South Carolina’s colonial land market. Soc Sci Hist 29:599–623
Mendels F (1971) Industrialization and population pressure in eighteenth-century Flanders. J Econ Hist 
31:269–271
Mendels F (1972) Proto industrialization: the first phase of the process of industrialization. J Econ Hist 
32:241–261
Mokyr J (1974) The industrial revolution in the low countries in the first half of the nineteenth century: a 
comparative case study. J Econ Hist 34:365–391
Mokyr J (1976) Industrial growth and stagnation in the low countries, 1800–1850. J Econ Hist 
36:276–278
Mokyr J (1977) Demand vs. supply in the industrial revolution. J Econ Hist 37:981–1008
Nef J (1943) The industrial revolution reconsidered. J Econ Hist 3:1–31
Nicholas D (1971) Town and countryside: social, economic and political tensions in fourteenth-century 
Flanders. De Tempel Bruges
North D (1981) Structure and change in economic history. W.W. Norton, New York
North D, Thomas R (1971) The rise and fall of the manorial system: a theoretical model. J Econ Hist 
31:777–803
Ogilvie S (2001) The economic world of the Bohemian serf: economic concepts, preferences, and con-
straints on the estate of Friedland, 1583–1692. Econ Hist Rev 44:439–440
Ogilvie S (2011) Institutions and European trade: merchant guilds, 1000–1800. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge
Parmentier S (1986) Het Liberaal Staatsinterventionisme in de  19de eeuw. Een concreet geval: de opricht-
ing van de A.S.L.K. Belgisch tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis 18:379–420
Pasleau S (2001) Une population au service de la cité du charbon, du fer et du verre. Seraing, 1846–1900. 
Espace, populations, sociétés 3:369–371
Peterson W (1986) Land quality and prices. Am J Agric Econ 68:812–819
 N. Devijlder, K. Schoors 
1 3
Place F, Migot-Adholla E (1998) The economic effects of land registration on smallholder farms in 
Kenya: evidence from Nyeri and Kakamega districts. Land Econ 74:360–373
Pounds N (1990) An historical geography of Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Rayp G, Ronsse S (2016) What determined the location of industry in Belgium, 1896–1961? J Interdiscip 
Hist 46:1–27
Rosenthal JL (1994) Rural credit markets and aggregate shocks: the experience of Nuits St. Georges, 
1756–1776. J Econ Hist 54:288–306
Sabbe E (1975) De Belgische vlasnijverheid. Nationaal Vlasmuseum, Kortrijk
Schofield P, Lambrecht T (2009) Introduction. Credit and the rural economy in north-western Europe, 
C.1200–C.1800. In: Schofield P, Lambrecht T (eds) Credit and rural economy in north-western 
Europe, C 1200–C 1800. Brepols, Turnhout, pp 1–19
Sokoloff K (1997) Manufacturing where agriculture predominates: evidence from the south and midwest 
in 1860 National Bureau of Economic Research working paper series
Stiglitz J, Weiss A (1981) Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. Am Econ Rev 
71:393–410
Thoen E, Soens T (2009) Credit in rural Flanders, C. 1250–1600: its variety and significance. In: Scho-
field P, Lambrecht T (eds) Credit and rural economy in north-western Europe, C 1200–C 1800. 
Brepols, Turnhout, pp 19–38
Van Bavel B, van Cruyningen P, Thoen E (2010) The low countries 1000–1750. In: Van Bavel B (ed) 
Hoyle R. Social relations: property and power, Turnhout Brepols, pp 167–199
Van Den Berg G (1988) Eigendom. Grepen uit de geschiedenis van een omstreden begrip, Kluwer
van der Herten B (1995) De Industriële Revolutie gedragen door een transportrevolutie. In: van der 
Herten B, Oris M, Roegiers J (eds) Nijver België. Het industriële landschap omstreeks 1850. Lan-
noo, Tielt, pp 41–47
van der Herten B (2000) De ontwikkeling van communicatie en transport in België tijdens de lange 19de 
eeuw, Leuven
van Der Wee H, Verbreyt M (1985) Mensen maken Geschiedenis. De Kredietbank en de Economische 
opgang van Vlaanderen, 1935–1985. Lannoo, Tielt
Van Mole L (1986) Spaarwezen en spaarkassen in België 1890–1914. Op zoek naar meer sociale zek-
erheid voor doelgroepen. In: Van Put A (ed) De Belgische Spaarbanken. Tielt, Lanoo, pp 121–159
Vanhaute E (2007) ‘So worthy an example to Ireland’ The subsistence and industrial crisis of 1845–1850. 
In: Paping R, Vanhaute E, Gráda C (eds) When the potato failed: causes and effects of the last Euro-
pean subsistence crisis, 1845–1850. Turnhout, Brepols, pp 123–148
Veraghtert K (1978) Geld, Bankwezen en Handel in De Zuidelijke Nederlanden 1792-1884. In: Blok P, 
Prevenier W et al (eds) Algemene Geschiedenis Der Nederlanden 10. Fibula- Van Dishoeck, Haar-
lem, pp 323–360
Verhulst A (1958) De Sint-Baafsabdij te Gent en haar grondbezit, 7e-14e eeuw: bijdrage tot de kennis van 
de Structuur en de uitbating van het grootgrondbezit in Vlaanderen tijdens de Middeleeuwen. Paleis 
Der Academiën, Brussel
Witte E, Parmentier S (1986) Het Belgische spaarbankwezen in de eerste helft van de 19de eeuw: een 
zaak van door de Overheid gesteunde ‘haute finance’. In: Van Put A (ed) De Belgische Spaarbanken. 
Lannoo, Tielt, pp 55–75
Yernault D (2011) L’État et la propriété. Permanences et mutations du droit public économique en Bel-
gique de 1830–2011. Brussels
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
